The discussion surrounding the latter work has occasionally attempted a closer determination of the kind of theological procedure it represents or of its antecedents.
The difficulty of Jüngel's German prose along with the subtlety and occasional obscurity of his thought have been often remarked. The task of clear summary is rendered even more difficult in the case of this topic, which touches the nerve center of the tangled interrelations of the various theological loci. Nor can there be much more than a cursory attempt to indicate the web of influences behind Jüngel's conception of the theological program, although the immediate influence of Barth, Bultmann, and the so-called neo-Bultmannians (Fuchs and Ebeling) will be readily apparent to anyone familiar with German theology since the Second World War. But Jüngel's position cannot be reduced to a mere function or convergence of these influences; his ideas have their own internal connection and characteristic trajectory, which this study will seek to delineate. "happens." Jüngel extends this complex of metaphors to the relation of God to individual human beings within the world. If God's interaction with creation is God's coming, then God's interaction with humanity is God's speaking. God speaks a "word" to humanity, and when people actually hear and respond to that word there then occurs that event which is analogous to the world's truth: faith.
It is crucial to see that for Jüngel "faith" in the Christian sense is simply not a general human possibility. The capacity for faith is not "built-in" to the structure of human existence, at least not in the sense that it could be actualized at will, or in the course of normal human interaction. It is a response to the concrete occurrence of the word from God, which is dependent on God's coming to the world. Hence, the event of truth is the ground of the event of faith. And so it must be said that faith is not an anthropological category, nor is it an "expression" of the human subject; it is an occurrence in which the human person participates.
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Faith comes to a person, it comes from God, and it comes in the form of the word (which, as the word of the one who comes to the world as the world's truth, can itself be called both the word of faith and the word of truth).
These expressions are admittedly abstract. Two questions in particular demand attention. Materially, what is the content of this word, what does it say? Formally, how is it communicated, what happens when a human being "hears" and responds to this word?
The answer to both questions is implicit in Jüngel's affirmation that the word of God is none other than the man Jesus of Nazareth, a quite traditional statement but in this case deeply informed by the particular developments associated with Barth and Bultmann. As a living figure in the past this person is both a personal identity and a complex of events and actions, the subject of a narrative or history (Geschichte). The event of faith occurs when the word about this person is received as the story of God's own coming to the world, so that Jesus himself is apprehended as God's past and continuing word to humanity. A person hears the word about Jesus, and in accepting Jesus as God's decisive activity within the world, as God's "Christ," that person participates in the reality of faith.
Thus the answer to the first question about the content of the word leads immediately to the second question about what it means to hear this word. This close connection of the subjective and objective poles in the event of faith is no accident; indeed, for Jüngel, the peculiar unity of subject and object in faith touches on its deepest meaning. In fact, he 7 'Theologische Wissenschaft" 19. Herein lies for Jüngel the cogency of Barth's protest against neo-Protestant "subjectivism." Nevertheless, Jüngel follows Bultmann in orienting Christian theology directly to the phenomenon of faith, Barth's sardonic comments about "pisteology" notwithstanding. 8 See "Zur Lehre vom Heiligen Geist" 115; also 'Theologische Wissenschaft" 22.
follows Bultmann in holding that human participation in faith opens up a new self-understanding for the participant. 9 The term "understanding" (Verstehen) as used by Bultmann, following Heidegger, is laden with existential significance. It is not simply a kind of knowledge, but rather the permeation or conditioning of a person's entire existence by some determinate meaning. As a response of the total person it involves knowledge, to be sure, but extends beyond that to encompass all action in response to that knowledge.
Thus a person's response to the word in faith is an act ofthat person's entire existence, in which acts both of knowledge and of will are involved as essentially related moments.
10 And as self-understanding it means that one comes to a new understanding of one's own reality. But calling faith "self-understanding" seems to make the "object" of faith to be one's own self, whereas it has already been determined that faith is oriented to the word of Jesus Christ. How can faith be at once the unity of subject and object (the self coming to a new understanding of itself) and also the response to a word from beyond the self?
The answer for Jüngel, again following Bultmann, can only be that in hearing and accepting the word about Jesus Christ one is ipso facto and at the same time accepting a new reality for one's self. In the word, Jesus is identified as the human being whose existence is in every way a perfect correspondence (Entsprechung) to God's reality. In accepting this word, one elects to receive this existence as one's own; in fact, in making this very decision one is already actually participating in this new existence and in the new self-understanding which comes with it. In the word of Jesus one's very reality is revealed as something coming from beyond, from outside. The reality, the existence that had hitherto been accepted as one's own, the self painstakingly constructed from a lifetime of acts, is now revealed as a deadly self-deception. It is, to use Pauline language, a life according to "flesh" (sarx). This "natural" existence only becomes visible to a person in the act of faith; only when the new self-understanding is received is one's old existence revealed for what it was, a past now done away with.
In the old self-understanding one exists in accordance with what one is or does; in the new self-understanding, one exists in accordance with what one has received from God.
11 Thus there is the closest connection in faith between the internal and the external: faith is " 'a letting-bedetermined by what is known' and thus 'a being-in-what is known'."
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The phrase "what is known" here refers of course to the word of Jesus Christ. It points to a central issue in Jüngel's conception of faith: the relation of faith to knowledge.
In several places in his writings Jüngel has striven to distinguish the genuine New Testament idea of faith (represented paradigmatically by Paul) from the influential definition by Plato of faith (pistis) as a species of mere opinion (doxa), to be distinguished from true knowledge or episteme. True knowledge is knowledge of being, whereas faith is related to matters of becoming; it is a kind of knowing, but a deficient kind. 13 For Jüngel this makes the mistake of classifying faith as one among a set of anthropological possibilities, whereas faith conditions our total existence both in its cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. Faith is not a deficient mode of knowledge, but knowledge is an inherent moment of faith. And as a distinct moment it has a certain relative validity and independence.
Bultmann wants to subsume this moment completely within the praxis of Christian existence. But for Jüngel the knowledge that faith has of its object must be theoretical as well as practical, and this theoretical aspect "indeed can never be isolated from the practical character of this knowledge, but just as little can it be absorbed by it."
14 Hence he can say that faith as the human correspondence to God's word is not only the free act of "ex-centrically" grounding oneself outside oneself (trust in God, Gottvertrauen), but is also a knowledge directing itself to the ground of faith as its object, as the event of truth (knowledge of God, Gotteserkenntnis) . 15 This knowledge is not a kind of supercession of faith. For Jüngel the Anselmian fides quaerens intelledum cannot be understood to mean that faith finds its end or telos in knowledge. Faith does not pass over into knowledge; instead, faith's knowledge is for the sake of faith itself: fides quaerens intellectum quaerentem fidem.
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It was seen above that the object of faith (the event of God's word) is at the same time the ground of faith's possibility. This close coordination of ground (Grund) and object (Gegenstand) is central to the discussion of the cognitive dimension of faith. Jüngel agrees with Bultmann that God (in God's word) is only given along with the act of faith, but he goes on to argue that this means that God is also "given" for the element of knowledge implicit in faith. Indeed, the word must be known as something over against the individual (ein Gegenüber) in order for it to be the ground of belief. 17 In this way it could be said that the fact that faith knows is grounded in what faith knows. The theoretical moment witnesses to the grounding of faith from beyond the individual's existence (ek-stasis). There is a constitutive tension in theology due to the fact that the individual is attempting to bring under discursive, reflective scrutiny the very power which determines and shapes his or her existence. Jüngel speaks of faith and thought as two powers which put existence into movement. Where there are two movements, there is the possibility of an encounter between them, or even a clash. 21 The potential for conflict, and thus the internal tension of theology, is heightened in the present time because theology as thought is part of the changing history of thought. Discursive rationality is not a fixed structure; it is part of the social and intellectual history of humanity, and assumes different forms over time. In the modern epoch, thought aspires to the ideal form of "science" (Wissenschaft); to be scientific is the goal driving responsible thought in our period. 22 In short, theology must be a science, despite the fact that science in our day prescinds utterly from the question of God; it is a-theistic, at least with regard to its method.
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A more detailed examination of the scientific character of theology for Jüngel will be the task of the next section. But at this point a more basic question demands attention, namely, why faith needs theology at all, i.e., why it must be reflected upon in thought. According to Jüngel, of faith from the praxis of faithful existence, he is concerned that Pannenberg's approach attempts to secure a purely theoretical kind of knowledge of God. Jüngel agrees with Pannenberg that the content of faith is not a product of the pure act of faith, rather that the very possibility of the act is grounded in the content (i.e. in God as the object of faith). But Jüngel insists that the content which grounds the act of faith is nevertheless only given in the context ofthat act; see his "Nihil divinitatis, ubi non fides," Zeitschrift fur faith stands in need of constant self-critique, a critique that only thought can undertake, and that therefore can only be accomplished for faith by theology. But what is the function of such a critique? The simplest way to approach this admittedly complex question is to take up Jüngel's language of a dual distinction. Granted that the event of faith is an event in which God and the human person come into the closest correspondence, then theology's task is to distinguish faith from God on the one hand, and from the believer on the other.
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This is by no means as straightforward as it may sound. For Jüngel knowledge of God is only given in the praxis of Christian existence; indeed it is true in a certain sense that God is only present where faith is present. 25 Because of this reciprocal relationship faith is constantly threatened with a "Feuerbachian" inversion, seeing itself as grounding God rather than vice versa. Theology is the critique of faith; it thinks the event of faith in such a way as to elucidate the foundational role of God's act, and this means the concrete history of Jesus, his death and Resurrection. Otherwise, faith might become so absorbed in its present existential reality as to turn the word "God" into a mere cipher for the actual grounding of faith within the structure of human existence itself. Were that to happen, the ultimate truth that God is the "creator fidei in nobis" would be displaced by the equally ultimate but perilously ambitious insight of Luther that faith is the "creatrix divinitatis in nobis.
The necessity of this act of dual differentiation is closely connected to the event-character of faith. It is an occurrence in which God and human beings enter into a determinate configuration, in fact into the closest communication; but precisely because of this intimate proximity thought takes care that the two "moments" of faith, the divine and the human, retain their respective identities. God and faith are not identical, even though the event of faith is the locus of God's very presence. Nor is faith identical with the believer's existence, even though faith is an event radically conditioning that existence. "Were faith not distinguished from God, then 'God' would become a superfluous word. Were the believer not distinguished from faith, then faith would become a matter of course (selbstverständlich)"
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Another perspective on the same question of theology's critical task of thinking faith, one which more closely delineates the nature of concrete theological reflection, is provided by Jüngel's statement that theology involves properly relating the "richness" of faith to the "poverty" of Jesus.
28 Jesus' poverty is the frailness of his utter humanity, the fragility of a public human history, terminating in the catastrophic When theology thinks faith, it recalls it to its ground beyond itself. To be sure it is grounded in God; but God here can only mean the word of the crucified man Jesus as Christ. Jüngel's insistence, mentioned above, that the ground of faith must be brought into the closest relation to the object of faith holds true here as well. For Jüngel (in accord with Christian tradition) God's very Spirit is the ground of the believer's present faith. But the object of faith is the word of God, the history of Jesus Christ. To say ground and object are one is to say that God the Spirit and God in Christ are one; the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Jesus Christ.
This construal of theology as a kind of basic rational reflection on faithful existence invites the question of its relation to philosophy, a question all the more relevant given Jüngel's constant probing of the philosophical tradition. Much of his later writing involves critical conversations with the standard "classical" categories of anthropology and metaphysics. Indeed, his careful and historically informed critiques of, for example, the traditional ontological privilege enjoyed by actuality over possibility, or of the metaphysical reading of God in terms of a "highest" or "most perfect" being, are central to his material theological project. The revision and ad hoc utilisation of philosophical motifs according to theological criteria points to a conscious eclecticism justly associated with the name of Barth. But this practical relationship of the theologian to philosophy is grounded in a strict formal delimitation of the two disciplines.
Already before the publication of the programmatic essays on theology, Jüngel was struggling against any attempts to conflate theological and philosophical thinking, particularly certain arguments for a direct dependence of theological categories upon the kind of fundamental ontology propounded by Heidegger. In his first published work, Jüngel registered sharp disagreement with Heinrich Ott's demand for come to speech in the language-events characterizing the New Testament in a manner which binds theology to precisely these languageevents."
32 The same concern surfaces at key points in his well-known book on Barth's doctrine of the Trinity; Barth's language of God's "being" is not grounded in a conception of being in general, but arises from faith's reflection on God's revelation in Christ. For Jüngel, the independence of theology from any philosophical grounding demands the sharpest possible distinction between the two kinds of thinking.
This necessary distinction is touched on only briefly in the articles of chief concern here, most notably in Die Freiheit der Theologie, where the same distinction is made in a highly schematic way. Theology "hands over" the word to thought, and does so in such a way that the "otherness" of the word over against thought is preserved. That is, the word itself is linguistically mediated via the event of proclamation and is appropriated as word only in the facticity of the faith response. It is not derived from the structure of thought itself as a general human possibility. In contrast, Jüngel understands philosophy (formally speaking) to be thought's self-reflection, the "handing over" to thought of thought itself. As such, philosophy is its own justification: it "posits itself absolutely," being grounded in the very nature of thought. Theology cannot posit itself; it is parasitic, so to speak, upon the occurrence of the word in history.
THEOLOGY AS SCIENCE AND THE THEOLOGICAL DISCIPLINES
It can be seen why for Jüngel theology, since it critically thinks faith for the sake of faith, is defined by a dual responsibility. As critical thought it is caught up in the ongoing history of thought; it must be current, true to its time (zeitgemäss). But as the self-criticism of faith it must measure faith by the word; it must be responsible to the event of the word as its object (sachgemäss). 36 Theology is actualized in the interaction of these two responsibilities and in the attempt to locate the ground of their unity.
In the modern period, theology has repeatedly been conceived as a scientific endeavor; this is part of what it means for theology to be true to its time. It has long been a commonplace of German theory of science that the nature and unity of a science is determined by the object of that science. 37 As will be seen, the object of theology has a certain complexity which has resulted in the development of different subdisciplines of theology arising within the academy, each coordinated to a different aspect ofthat object and each employing different methods. Each of these sub-disciplines has tended to have a "natural" alliance with its closest nontheological counterparts, looking to the latter for methodological clarity and scientific legitimation. Biblical studies might align itself with philology or ancient history, church history with secular world history, systematic theology with philosophy, etc. The obvious danger is that the unity of the former disciplines as part of a single theological enterprise might be eroded, and each might drift apart from the others, gradually becoming "naturalized," or even vanishing altogether as separate disciplines.
For Jüngel this problem of the unity of the theological disciplines is not merely an organizational difficulty; it is central to any configuration of theology as a science. 38 For the basis of his approach Jüngel recurs to Schleiermacher's dispute with Fichte on the propriety of theology as a distinct faculty within the university. 39 Jüngel claims that the aporia within theology exposed by Fichte (i.e. the tension between its claim to a place within the realm of science and its appeal to a particular revelation) was transformed by Schleiermacher into the very foundation of its scientific character. ° According to Schleiermacher's brilliant Theology, theology's appeal to a particular revelation means that its realm of investigation is a particular historical complex, the living tradition of the Christian God-consciousness and its objectified forms over time. In addition, the unity of the various disciplines comprising theology is insured within the university not by the speculative construction of its object, nor by its place within a system of sciences derived from the nature of pure thought. The unity of theology lies in its being ordered to the practical function of training leaders of the Christian Church. It is the "positivity" of theology, its direct connection with concrete praxis, which binds the various theological disciplines into a unity. Jüngel constructs his own conception of theological science on the two foundations laid by Schleiermacher: theology's fundamentally historical character (its Geschichtlichkeit) and its practical goal (its Positivität). "The historical nature of its scientific object brings theology into the realm of the sciences.-The historical nature of its practical aim grants theology the unity of a single science." 42 This statement shows what Jüngel appropriates from Schleiermacher and at the same time how he moves beyond him. Schleiermacher did not succeed in thinking the historical goal of theology (the praxis of Christian existence) and the historical object of theology in their unity as one history.
In other words, theology must show how Christian praxis, the historical task laid on the Church in the present, springs from the kind of historical object it is concerned with in the past. Indeed, that object must be capable in the present of calling forth faith and serving as its criterion. 4 The central integrating concept which allows the coalescence of historical praxis and historical object and determines the proper organizational scheme of the theological disciplines is that of the word-as-event, or word-event. The presupposition of theology as an historical science is that the event of the word of God is only properly historically elucidated (historisch erklärt) when it is "answered for" by activity in present history (geschichtliche Verantwortung Historie and historisch connote the scholarly practice of historical science, whereas Geschichte and geschichtlich indicate the actual temporal career of persons or social collectives whether in the past or the present; (2) The verb verantworten means to answer or account for; the noun Verantwortung means responsibility. When Jüngel uses these words or others with the same root he seems to have simultaneously in mind the following shades of meaning: (a) the activity of accounting for something, (b) the activity stand the past occurrence of the word is to recognize a word addressing the present as well, an event which seeks its own repetition, its own propagation as an ever renewed happening (als erneut geschehendes).
Theology must historically explicate and interpret the word of God as an historical occurrence in the past, but it must do this only because it seeks to be responsible to that word in the present. The word-event conceptually and actually integrates theology's object and theology's purpose. In his own determination of the different theological disciplines Jüngel's use of the historical "repeatibility" of the word-event provides a four-fold division in place of Schleiermacher's tripartite scheme. 45 The complexities of this theological division of labor need only be briefly sketched here.
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The first two disciplines, exegesis and church history, are concerned with the past occurrence of the word-event. The one deals with the biblical text, the other with the entire later history of Christian tradition. The need for two separate disciplines might seem problematic, especially since Jüngel has pointed out that the divine word is available to theology only in its human formulations; in other words, the past event of the word is always historically mediated via its theological interpretations by those concerned. Hence no strict historical distinction can be drawn between the words of the Bible and those of later tradition.
But the words of the Bible are the original linguistic articulation of the dimension of God's decisive act; they are witnesses, born of the actual encounter with the reality of God's advent. They are thus "canonical," since it is only as shaped by these original theological decisions that the word is encountered by later generations.
47 Church history is concerned with the historically interpreted and "fixed" wordevent, measuring the interpretations against the primal word-event mediated in the words of Scripture. Exegesis, however, must engage in "Saehkritik"; it can only measure the scriptural interpretations against the reality which they themselves mediate.
The conception of the word-event and its repetition integrates the of responding to something, and (c) the state of being responsible or accountable to something. In this case the "something" is the same in all three meanings, namely the event of the word of God. 45 For Jüngel the principle of Schleiermacher's division remains sound: a historical theology combining exegesis and dogmatics, a philosophical theology mediating the relation of theology to the other sciences, and a practical theology mediating theology to the practical task of church leadership. But both Schleiermacher and Jüngel stress that these divisions are not exclusive, as all theological work must participate in all three tasks, albeit in different degrees according to the context. Although Jüngel sometimes uses similar terms, the principle of division is different, so that no one discipline in his scheme precisely corresponds to any of Schleiermacher's. 46 What follows synthesizes elements from the two detailed breakdowns of the theological disciplines offered in Die Freiheit der Theologie 33-34 and "Das Verhältnis der theologischen Disziplinen" 57-59.object of theology (the continual occurrence of the word in the past, its fixation in linguistic forms, springing from its original event) and the present goal of theology (to achieve a new formulation of the word from the canonical texts, a word for today). The latter is the specific task of practical theology. It is the science of the word of God as event, not in the sense of past event, but in the sense of something taking place now, in the present. In short, its particular province is the determination of church praxis, the responsibility of the believing community to respond to the word of Jesus Christ in the concrete situation. It seeks the possibility of proclaiming the present reality of Jesus Christ in thoughts, words, and actions.
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Exegesis inquires after the original event of the word to be repeated. The repetitions of the word occurring in the past are the concern of church history. The repetition of the word in the present is sought for by practical theology. But it is this very characteristic of the word, that it is repeatable, that it occurs again and again in history with unaltered power and validity, that is the concern of systematic theology.
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It asks about the relationship between the three forms of the word dealt with in the other disciplines, demonstrating their unity as modes of the one event of Jesus Christ. 50 Jüngel describes the inexhaustible reiteration of God's word in Jesus, its ability to enter into every new pattern of human self-understanding, as its truth. Systematic theology is the science of the word of God as truth.
Each discipline takes up a special responsibility vis-à-vis the word, thus achieving a partial "relieving" of the burden (Entlastung) which the others must bear. But the essential meaning of such "responsibility" is that God's word is the only object and goal of all theological activity. Neither the biblical text, nor the ecclesial tradition, nor even the presently existing Church can be mistaken for an end in itself. Therefore each discipline has a critical function; exegesis, church history, and practical theology are to be understood as critiques of the biblical texts, tradition, and present ecclesial praxis respectively. Because systematic theology considers all the disciplines in their unity, it must prevent their centrifugal drift toward purely secular status. It seeks to understand the nature of the theological by 48 "Das Verhältnis der theologischen Disziplinen" 58. 49 Paulus devotes considerable attention to the notion of "systematicity" in theology. In fact, he goes so far as to describe Jüngel's own theology as a "system of freedom" (Liebe-das Geheimnis der Welt 17). He admits that this represents a risky departure from Jüngel's own usage, and the specific justificatory citations he mentions are somewhat unconvincing. More helpful is his careful delimitation of the meaning of "system" in this context (ibid. 15). Theology can be called a system insofar as it is a "methodically presented doctrine of Christian faith" which, because of its character as discourse about God, concerns the structure of reality as a whole. Theology is also a system in another sense, as a unified interpretation of faith which in its separate parts and as a whole claims the identity of a single science. These are justified insights, even if their relation to Jüngel's sparse use of the term "systematic" remains obscure.
50 "Das Verhältnis der theologischen Disziplinen" 58.
entering into a "a critical conversation of faith with unbelief," and therefore functions as the self-critique of theology.
SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY AS HISTORICAL AND AS DOGMATIC
We have seen that Jüngel distinguishes two types of disposition toward the past. Historical explanation (historisches Erklären) involves application of the tools of historical science, the historicalcritical method, in the reconstruction of past events and their causal interrelations. But there is also responsibility for or toward the past (geschichtliche Verantwortung) which implies understanding the human past as both a demand and a possibility for human activity in the present. It is characteristic of Christian theology for Jüngel that these normally separable dispositions must be closely interrelated; the event of God's word and its repetition are to be ascertained and delineated through historical research, but, paradoxically, the event itself can only be recognized in faith, that is, as the power determining Christian existence in the present.
The difficult feat of unifying these dispositions as single moments of one concrete task is the condition for the very possibility of theology. One of Jüngel's several definitions of theology describes it as discerning the freedom of Christian existence in the responsibility of thought. Theology is challenged both by its special object (Sache) and by its present time (Zeit). Jüngel tends to associate the "discerning of Christian existence" with theology's objective concern, and the "responsibility of thought" with the peculiar demand of the present. 52 The historical nature of theology which he insists upon is not just a function of its adopting the peculiarly modern form of historical understanding, historical-critical method. It also demands the recognition of the "historicity" of theology's object, which means to take up responsibility to the word-event in faith. Historical-scientific explanation and historicalexistential responsibility are the two poles between which theology is unified as "historical."
This paradox that arises in the juxtaposition of explanation and responsibility is resolved for Jüngel by carefully distinguishing between "historical" and "dogmatic" perception (Wahrnehmung) of the past. Theology does not have direct access to the past event of God's word. Instead, it must reconstruct the shape ofthat event through the faith testimony of those among whom the event occurred. In other words, the divine word is available only through the historical medium of human language, language in the form of theological interpretation. Looking back to the word, theological interpretation always encounters an earlier theological interpretation.
That the event of Jesus is God's own advent is never directly visible from historical facts, and was not so visible even to contemporaries of Ibid. 59.
Die Freiheit der Theologie 30. the event. 53 But the linguistic and conceptual form in which these witnesses articulated their faith perception, and therefore that perception itself, are both very much a function of the social and intellectual milieu or the symbolic universe within which they moved, and are thus subject to historical investigation. "Of course, all these claims [i.e. of faith] have entered into a necessary and close connection with a wealth of [historical] delimitations and completely determinate representations." 54 Faith must perceive the contours of the original word-event through the interpretation of past faith confessions; the first step in accomplishing this must be the most rigorous historical examination of those testimonies which is possible.
Another way of grasping the task involved here is to say that the word of revelation is only given to theology "according to human reception (secundum recipientem hominem)." To move from the critical or purely historical movement to the dogmatic one means to grasp (in an historically informed way) the context of that human word of confession as an original revelatory event, the event to which it is the response and of which it is the linguistic articulation; the word of revelation received mirrors, albeit with inevitable distortion, the word as spoken by God (secundum dicentem Deum). 55 The historical artifact of linguistically fixed confession is for theology an abstraction from an original concrete situation of correspondence between God and human beings, a faith situation. The turn from historical to dogmatic perception is an act of faithful imaginative reconstruction of that situation. That such reconstruction is fraught with uncertainty and the potential for ideological deformation is manifest, but it is still the crux of theological interpretation.
The moment of historical explanation in theology is, so to speak, a "secular" enclave within theological understanding. It "reckons with the world 'etsi Deus non daretur (as if there were no God)'." But the act of theological understanding always involves a complementary act of dogmatic interpretation, which as the responsible answer in faith to the past word will not allow theology to "reckon with God 'etsi Deus non daretur'." 56 In this complementarity of historical and dogmatic perception, neither properly grounds the other, and yet dogmatic perception is dependent upon historical perception because of the linguisticality of Christian faith. "Dogmatic perception is interpretation of historically perceived language as the language of past faith for the 53 Clearly, when Jüngel claims that "the historical-critical method is the way to the word of theology" he does not imply that the dogmatic method has been supplanted. Against an interpretation of theological history such as that of Troeltsch, which sees the historical method as the legitimate successor of a now obsolete dogmatic method, Jüngel asserts the integral relation of the dogmatic and historical in every act of theological understanding. 59 In this he again claims to follow the lead of Schleiermacher, who, by uniting exegesis and dogmatics under the one heading of historical theology, was at once opposing Fichte's demand for a strictly nonhistorical (i.e. nonconfessional or philosophical) theology in the university, and rejecting the theological tradition (running back to Gabler) of a strict separation of exegetical and dogmatic theology.
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Jüngel's summary formula of his position shows his love for dialectically balanced assertions. "Because theology is historically (geschichtlich) responsible for nothing which it has not also historically (historisch) explicated, theology is in every respect historical. But because theology is historically responsible for what it historically explicates, it is in every respect dogmatic." 61 With regard to this difficult relationship, so central to his vision of theology, Jüngel makes the remarkable claim that "[t]he tension between historical and dogmatic understanding is to be resolved in a critique of historical reason which has yet to be written." 62 Theology is still awaiting an analysis of the rational categories that determine both how past historical events are apprehended and how these events are integrated within the present historical trajectory of human understanding. Lacking such a categorical framework, the theological integration of past history and present historicity will appear as a tenuous and tension-filled procedure. mous" thought is capable of. It initiates a struggle within reason over the very nature of rationality. Thus theology not merely participates in the dispute of the faculties; it must simultaneously challenge the very terms of the dispute. The encounter with faith turns thought back upon itself; the dispute is transformed into "a dispute over the dispute itself (einen Streit um den Streit selbst)."
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The current ferment in Western universities, whether seen as the death throes of "late modernity" or the birth pangs of a new intellectual situation transcending the modern ("postmodernity"), is intimately linked to a radical questioning and rethinking of the role and structure of the academy and the constructions of rationality imbedded within it. By implication, the kind of theology envisaged by Jüngel cannot sit back and await the result of the current disputes. It must be an active participant, and not just because of tactical or "apologetic" considerations. It is an essential function of the theological project to question and to examine the traditions of human thought in light of their encounter with faith, or rather in light of faith's encounter with the radical truth of humanity disclosed in God's address.
